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Abstract 
The relationship between development aid and recipients’ ‘good behaviour’ 
(human rights, democracy, and good governance) has been frequently examined, in a 
belief that giving more aid to countries with better performance in these areas can 
motivate their improvement. Most researchers agree that traditional, Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) donors reward recipients’ ‘good behaviour’ at least to 
some extent; however, the ‘new’, non-DAC donors have so far been portrayed as 
largely unconcerned with these issues.  
In this paper, I examine the evidence underlying such claims, by investigating 
whether human rights, democracy, and good governance play any role in ‘new’ 
donors’ aid allocation. I find that similar to DAC donors, many non-DAC donors pay 
heed to recipients’ democracy, human-rights or good-governance records at some 
point in their aid decision-making process. These results suggest that the fears raised 
regarding the nature of ‘new’ aid might be unfounded and rather point to the 
emergence of stronger global norms vis-à-vis the importance of human rights, good 
governance, and democracy to development. 
 
Keywords: development aid, non-DAC, DAC, human rights, democracy, good 
governance 
 
Introduction 
In development aid research, there has lately been an increasing interest in the aid activities 
of ‘new’, or more precisely, of non-Development Assistance Committee (non-DAC) donors 
such as China or the Arab states. As Manning (2006) emphasised, some of these donors have 
provided aid to developing countries for more than half a century and thus really are not new 
to development assistance at all. Nevertheless, the presence and impact of their aid programmes 
were small relative to those of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)i donors from 
the 1980s up until the beginning of the 2000s before rising again in relative significance.  
This surging importance has been met with a mixed reception among Western researchers 
and commentators. For example, Woods (2008) described the emerging donors’ aid 
programmes as more flexible and hence an often preferable alternative for recipients to the 
frequently intrusive and administratively burdensome DAC aid. On the other hand, Naím 
(2007), in a now famous Foreign Policy piece, referred to the aid programmes of countries such 
as China, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela as undemocratic and rogue and warned that by 
displacing DAC aid programmes, these new donors constituted a threat to ‘healthy, sustainable 
development’. In a similar vein although weighing his words more carefully, Manning (2006) 
raised the possibility that non-DAC donors, by providing aid without conditioning it on human 
rights or good governance, would cause many developing countries to postpone desirable 
adjustments of their domestic policies.  
Due to the paucity of available data, only several researchers have examined non-DAC aid 
programmes empirically thus far. Those mostly concluded that although not too different from 
DAC donors, non-DAC ones pay less heed to their aid recipients’ needs (e.g. Woods 2008; 
Dreher et al. 2011). No study to date, however, has systematically investigated whether non-
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DAC aid programmes are indeed more ‘rogue’ than the DAC ones; i.e. whether they differ in 
conditioning their aid on recipients’ ‘good behaviourii’ (human rights, democracy, and good 
governance). This paper aims to fill this particular gap in literature and thus contribute to 
building the pool of existing knowledge about the nature of non-DAC aid programmes, which 
is critical to determining their likely impact on their aid partners’ development.  
This article proceeds in the following manner. First, I discuss the theoretical underpinnings 
of conditioning aid on recipients’ good behaviour. Second, I introduce existing empirical 
findings on the link between aid provision on the one side and human rights, democracy, and 
good governance on the other, paying special attention to research on non-DAC donors, and 
formulate several hypotheses. Subsequently, I discuss my case selection, describe the sources, 
limitations, and descriptive statistics of the data used, and introduce the empirical methods 
chosen to analyse the data. Following that, I present my main results and assess their robustness 
through a series of sensitivity tests. I finish with a discussion of my main findings and 
concluding remarks. 
 
Aid and recipients’ human rights, democracy, and good governance 
 
Theoretical linkages between aid and recipients’ good behaviour 
 In the past decades, there has been a growing recognition amongst DAC donors that human 
rights, democracy, and good governance constitute an integral part of development. The DAC 
acknowledged the importance of human rights and good governance to economic and social 
development for the first time in 1993, in its report Orientations on Participatory Development 
and Good Governance (DAC, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
[OECD] 1993: 8). A more recent, 2013 OECD–World Bank report Integrating Human Rights 
into Development explicitly stated that ‘human development and human rights are embedded 
and reinforce each other conceptually and in practice’ (OECD-World Bank 2013: 118). A 2014 
DAC report Accountability and Democratic Governance expressed the view that development 
requires effective governance and democratic institutions that could deliver tangible results 
(DAC, OECD 2014). By extension, most DAC donors in their development platforms have 
expressed the belief that the programming of development assistance has an obligation to take 
recipients’ human rights, democracy, and good governance into account. 
 Different aid agencies have adopted various ways of doing so, from human-rights based 
programming through mainstreaming human rights, democracy, and good governance in their 
work to applying conditionality. Even though the last approach, conditionality, is 
recommended by the World Bank and OECD (2013) to be used only as a policy of last resort, 
most bilateral DAC agencies explicitly promise to increase or decrease their volume of aid to 
recipients in response to their performance in human rights, democracy, and good governance 
(Piron and De Renzio 2005). Empirical research is split on whether such conditioning indeed 
promotes good behaviour by aid recipients but many researchers maintain that it does (e.g. 
Hazelzet 2005; King 1999). Moreover, aid has been shown to be more effective at achieving 
its goals in countries with better governance, human rights, and democracy records (e.g. 
Burnside and Dollar 2000; Jenkins and Scanlan 2001; Kosack 2003; Petrikova 2015). Due to 
the difficulty in measuring the integration of human rights, democracy and good governance 
into aid programming via other means, aid conditioning is the policy approach examined in 
this paper, as an approximation of donors’ regard for recipients’ good behaviouriii. The absence 
of agreement amongst researchers and policy makers vis-à-vis how the different components 
of good behaviour should be measured constitutes an additional layer of difficulty here, which 
I discuss in greater detail in the ‘Data and descriptive statistics’ section.  
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Practice by DAC donors 
Empirical research has shown that despite their pro-good behaviour rhetoric, DAC donors 
do not condition their aid provision on recipients’ human rights, democracy, and good 
governance consistently. However, they do appear to do so at least occasionally. Examining 
the behaviour of all DAC donors, Neumayer (2003a, 2003b) found them to take into account 
recipients’ human rights primarily at the eligibility stage – when deciding whether to disburse 
any aid to a country at all – with only a few, predominantly Nordic, donors following up this 
commitment also at the level stage – when deciding how much aid to disburse. Nielsen (2013) 
also discovered DAC aid to be partially responsive to human rights violations. Doucouliagos 
and Paldam (2011) confirmed these findings in a meta-analysis of 47 studies linking DAC aid 
and human rights/democracy, in which they found that both human rights and democracy had 
a positive and significant , albeit small, impact on the provision of DAC aid, with democracy 
more so than human rights. Regarding the conditioning of aid on good governance, a relatively 
newer goal, literature suggests that the DAC efforts have been quite tentative and haphazard 
but not completely absent (Dollar and Levin 2006; Youngs 2002). 
 
Practice by non-DAC donors 
 How have non-DAC donors fared in this regard? As mentioned in the introduction, mixed 
emotions have greeted their rising importance. In addition to the negative expectations voiced 
by Naím (2007) and Manning (2006), Neumayer (2003c) in his investigation of aid provision 
from the Gulf States also concluded that Arab donors would render their aid more beneficial if 
they aligned it more closely with DAC goals. Similarly, Kragelund (2008) maintained that the 
rising importance of non-DAC donors in Africa complicated efforts to harmonise aid flows and 
Paulo and Reisen (2010) alleged that the growing relevance of new donors weakened DAC’s 
normative aid-giving framework. On the other hand, Zimmerman and Smith (2011) praised the 
new donors for bringing to the table new development solutions and Chandy and Kharas (2011) 
posited that non-DAC donors have demonstrated as deep an interest in delivering a positive 
impact on recipient countries as DAC donors. Studies by Dreher et al. (2011) and Woods 
(2008) provided some empirical support for the latter side of the argument, showing that non-
DAC aid programmes do not dramatically differ from DAC ones.  
 Where the two sides of the opinion spectrum about non-DAC donors largely converge, 
however, is the belief that non-DAC aid is not conditioned on recipients’ good behaviour or 
‘merit’ in any way (e.g. Dreher et al. 2013). This belief has been primarily rooted in the strong 
emphasis placed on non-interference in the internal affairs of aid recipient countries by key 
documents underpinning non-DAC aid provision, including the ten Bandung Principles 
(1995)iv and the eight principles of Chinese aid laid out by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1964 (Chandy 
and Kharas 2011; Mawdsley 2012). Non-DAC donors that are members of the OECD might 
constitute an exception here because they have generally signed on to the DAC manifesto of 
promoting recipients’ good behaviour through aid. 
 Nevertheless, the empirical evidence on the relationship between recipients’ good behaviour 
and non-DAC aid is still largely missing. Dreher et al. (2011) found no significant link between 
aid giving by 16 non-DAC donors and recipients’ levels of corruption but did not look at the 
aid’s relationship with human rights, democracy or good governance more generally. Dreher 
and Fuchs (2011) did look at the effects of human rights on Chinese aid and found no 
correlation, with McCormick (2008) confirming that finding. Szent-Iványi (2012) arrived at a 
similar conclusion of no relationship vis-à-vis the aid programmes of four central European 
countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia), despite their membership in the 
OECD. However, the aid programmes of most non-DAC donors have to date not been 
examined from this perspective. 
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Hypotheses 
 In light of the existent research summarised above, as a benchmark I expect to discover 
DAC aid to be positively and significantly influenced by recipients’ good behaviour, i.e. their 
performance in human rights, democracy, and good governance, at least some of the timev 
(Hypothesis 1). I do not anticipate the same result with regard to non-DAC programmes where 
I hypothesise that - perhaps with the exception of some non-DAC OECD members – they are 
not positively influenced by any aspect of recipients’ good behaviour (Hypothesis 2). On the 
other hand, I equally do not anticipate discovering non-DAC donors to be consciously 
rewarding recipients’ ‘bad behaviour’, by providing more aid to countries with worse human-
rights, democracy, and governance records (Hypothesis 3). 
 
Data and descriptive statistics 
 
Donors examined 
 In this paper, I first examine the aid programmes of 25 non-DAC donors - all those for 
whom sufficient data are publicly available. I consider data for all the countries at once but, 
following Zimmerman and Smith (2011), organise their results according to three loose 
groupings– non-DAC members of the OECD (Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, 
Iceland, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Turkey)vi, the 
providers of South-South Co-operation (Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, India, Russia, South 
Africa, Taiwan, and Thailand), and Arab donors (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates [UAE]). 
 As a point of comparison, I examine the aid programmes of the 24 established DAC donors, 
with their results comparably organised into five loose groupings. They are: the largest DAC 
donors (European Commission [EC], France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom [UK], and 
the United States [US]), the Nordic Plus donorsvii (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Norway and Sweden), southern European donors (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), other 
small European donors (Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Switzerland), and other non-
European donors (Australia, Canada, Korea, and New Zealand).  
 Most of the donor groupings utilised here are merely an attempt at organisation of the donors 
examined by certain common characteristics in order to facilitate the presentation of results, 
without extensive theoretical grounding. Consequently, the resultant groups are quite 
heterogeneous and alternative ones could have been created based on other donor traits. For 
example, Japan, included here in the largest DAC donors’ group based on the total volume of 
aid provided annually, could have instead been grouped with other non-European aid providers, 
since in its character Japanese aid arguably resembles Korean aid more than German or French 
aid, at least according to some authors (Arase 2005; Chun et al. 2010). The Nordic Plus 
grouping constitutes the most notable exception to this rule, since its members consciously 
seek to harmonise their aid provision in line with a shared set of beliefs and principles 
(Selbervik and Nygaard 2006). Nordic Plus donors are also believed to reward recipients’ good 
behaviour more consistently than any other donor (e.g. Gates and Hoeffler 2004). 
 
Choice of variables 
 
Dependent variables 
 The dependent variable in my study is official development assistance (ODA)viii per capita 
provided by each of the donors listed in the preceding section. The OECD defines ODA as 
financial flows to developing countries that have the official aim to promote economic and 
social development and whose grant element constitutes at least one fourth of the amount 
provided (OECD). I elected to examine ODA commitments rather than the more commonly 
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used disbursements primarily because most non-DAC aid data are available only in the form 
of commitments. There are also certain theoretical advantages to using commitment data, 
however. As White and McGillivray (1995) and Berthelemy (2006) opined, aid commitments 
are subject to fewer arbitrary executive decisions and less influenced by recipients’ 
administrative capacity than aid disbursements and hence might reflect donors’ intentions more 
closely.  
 The requisite data were obtained from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database of the 
OECD and from the AidData database. They are expressed in constant 2011 US dollars and 
cover 112 developing countries for ten years (2002-2011). I chose 2002 as the lower cut-off 
point because from that year aid data on many ‘new’ donors became available while 2011 
constitutes the upper border as the year with the most recent data accessible at the time of 
writing. 
 
Main independent variables 
 The main independent variables attempt to approximate the aid recipients’ performance in 
good behaviour, operationalised by human rights, democracy, and good governance. The three 
variables measure overlapping yet distinct aspects of state behaviour. I examine them together 
not out of a misplaced intention to conflate them but because international aid organisations 
including the OECD and national aid agencies have generally listed them together when 
referring to recipients countries’ good behaviour and to their own efforts to make aid more 
effective and responsible. For example, both the Millennium Declaration (2000) and the Busan 
Partnership Agreement (2011) posited that ‘promoting human rights, democracy, and good 
governance are an integral part of [donors’] development efforts’ (Busan Partnership 
Agreement: 1). 
 To turn to the variables’ conceptualisation, the theoretical concept of human rights is 
relatively clear, as it is embodied in the widely accepted Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948). Determining the quality of countries’ adherence to human rights quantitatively 
is naturally more problematic. Several possible measures exist – in this paper, I chose to use 
the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) indicators of political and civil rightsix and of social and 
economic rights, measured on a 0-8 and a 0-14 scales respectively, with higher numbers 
denoting better performance. However, in order to increase the validity of my results, in a 
sensitivity analysis I utilise secondary human rights indicators, namely the political rights and 
civil liberties measures published by Freedom House (FH)x. In their original format, both 
measures vary from 1 to 7, with higher numbers indicative of worse performance; however, in 
order to render them more easily comparable with the CIRI data, I reversed the scales to make 
higher numbers signify better human rights records. 
 What exactly constitutes democracy is more disputed but most researchers agree with the 
Webster dictionary definition as a ‘form of government in which the supreme power is vested 
in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation 
usually involving periodically held free elections’xi. Currently, the most frequently used 
measure of the quality of democracy is Polity IV project’s polity2, which scores countries from 
-10 to 10, with higher marks awarded to countries with more democratic regimes.  
 The most theoretically cloudy concept is the one of ‘good governance.’ which some 
researchers understand as the process by which authority in a country is exercised, others as 
the mechanisms and institutions that enable such process, while yet others as the outcomes of 
the process (Abdellatif 2003). Here I have chosen to adhere to the OECD (2001) definition of 
good governance as institutions/policies that are 
 
‘participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, 
equitable and inclusive and follow the rule of law. [Also, they] assure that corruption is 
6 
 
minimised, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most 
vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making’ 
 
since this understanding of good governance is promoted, at least amongst DAC donors, as the 
one to endorse through the provision of aid. The OECD did not come up with a governance 
measure of its own but the one most closely aligned with its definition, utilised in this paper, is 
the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), which score countries on a scale 
from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher numbers indicating better governance. 
 I include two human rights measures (first the CIRI ones and second the FH ones) with the 
democracy and governance measures in regressions at the same time as correlation tables and 
VIF tests allayed my fears of potentially too high multicollinearityxii. The correlation tables 
also demonstrated that all four measures are positively related to each other, confirming that a 
willing donor can reward recipients’ high human rights scores without automatically 
remunerating their low democracy or governance scores, and vice versa.  
 
Control variables 
 According to researchers including Neumayer (2003a) and Berthelemy (2006), aside from 
occasionally rewarding recipients’ good behaviour, donors are motivated in their aid giving by 
their own commercial and geopolitical interests on the one hand and by the recipients’ needs 
on the other. I operationalise donors’ own interests through the following variables: the value 
of exports from each donor to each aid recipient, the recipients’ military aid per capita received, 
a binary variable of whether a recipient was ever a colony, a binary variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the donor and recipient belong to the same region, and two religion variables (Christian 
and Muslim, referring to the predominantly practiced religion within a country). Additionally, 
I also control for the amount of total aid per capita received from other donors, as the amount 
a donor provides might be influenced by the aid disbursed by other donors (Tarp et al. 1999). 
The data utilised come from the IMF, AidData, CRS, and the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI). 
 As measures of aid recipients’ development needs, I use first their GDP per capita, expressed 
in constant 2011 US dollars, logged, and adjusted for purchasing power parity. Furthermore, I 
include Least-Developed Country (LDC), disaster, and conflict dummy variables as well as the 
log of the recipients’ populationxiii. These data were obtained from various sources, including 
the WDI, the Uppsala University Conflict Data Programme, and the International Disaster 
Database. 
 
Data limitations 
 Data on my independent variables, widely used by researchers, are generally seen as valid 
and reliable but the quality of some aid data is more questionable. Members of the DAC are 
required to share information about the provision of official development assistance with the 
OECD and its current quality is recognised to be good; however, that is not the case with all 
non-DAC donors. Particularly data on the aid committed by providers of South-South Co-
operation, which I obtained from the AidData database, are not very numerous and hence 
almost certainly incomplete. Chinese aid data, which were compiled by Dreher and Fuchs 
(2012), are often not even available as exact values, specifying instead only which country 
received Chinese aid in which yearxiv. 
 This reality certainly impacts my results but its negative consequences are not as extensive 
as they could initially appear. While it is probable that the available non-DAC aid data do not 
capture the full picture of the countries’ aid giving, there is generally no indication as to the 
existence of a specific bias to the omissions (Dreher and Fuchs 2012; Kim and Lightfoot 2011). 
Consequently, assuming that some aid information has been included and some excluded at 
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random, the resultant findings on the aid-good behaviour relationships should not differ 
significantly from those that one would attain with a more complete dataset. Nevertheless, until 
better data do become available, any conclusions about the nature of non-DAC aid do need to 
be conscious of these shortcomingsxv. 
 
Summary statistics 
 Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of the key variables used in my study, first for 2002 
and second for 2011. I aggregated aid commitments per capita by the different donor groupings 
used in order to facilitate the understanding of the data presented. The results clearly show that 
for all donor groups, aid commitments per capita of recipient countries increased from 2002 to 
2011, although the increase has been significantly more notable for non-DAC than for DAC 
donors. The number of recipient countries also grew for all donor groups, with the exception 
of the Nordic Plus donors. Both these trends are consistent with the reports of rising volumes 
of non-DAC aid; however, they are likely to be partially driven also by the increasing capacity 
and willingness of non-DAC donors to publicly disclose information about their aid provision. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of dependent and main independent variables 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
  
 Regarding the main independent variables, the average scores on CIRI’s political and civil 
rights as well as on FH’s political rights stayed the same in the period analysed and those on 
democracy slightly improved. However, the scores on governance, on civil liberties, and on 
social and economic rights deteriorated, likely reflecting a deepening social inequality both 
globally and in many countries also internally.  
 Finally, from the unlisted control variables, the levels of GDP per capita and military aid 
per capita rose, as did the values of exports from all the donors examined to developing 
countries. Vis-à-vis time-invariant variables, approximately 30 per cent of the sample are 
Least-Developed Countries, 80 per cent are former colonies, 50 per cent are majority Christian, 
and 30 per cent majority Muslim. 
 
Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Dependent variables*
Non-DAC donors
Non-DAC OECD aid per capita 118 0.28 0.69 0.0 5.0 124 1.24 3.23 0.0 18.7
South-South cooperation per capita 37 0.38 1.29 0.0 4.9 133 4.98 26.61 0.0 247.7
Arab aid per capita 89 0.43 1.80 0.0 13.8 109 1.36 6.64 0.0 60.8
DAC donors
Largest DAC donors' aid per capita 135 73.27 232.86 2043.1 2043.1 137 73.64 165.53 0.0 1306.7
Nordic Plus aid per capita 128 6.01 10.00 0.0 64 125 6.30 15.33 0.0 144.8
Southern European aid per capita 114 5.80 20.45 0.0 155.0 126 8.21 33.94 0.0 319.7
Small European donors' aid per capita 115 2.68 6.25 0.0 46.3 122 2.87 6.74 0.0 48.0
Other non-European aid per capita 133 17.66 82.13 0.0 824.8 134 21.99 102.05 0.0 992.2
Main independent variables
Political and civil rights (CIRI) 158 5.04 2.23 0.0 8.0 192 5.04 2.24 0.0 8.0
Social and economic rights (CIRI) 158 8.34 4.18 0.0 14.0 192 8.15 4.13 0.0 14.0
Political rights (FH) 192 4.64 2.16 1.0 7.0 194 4.62 2.16 1.0 7.0
Civil liberties (FH) 192 4.61 1.82 1.0 7.0 194 4.32 1.84 1.0 7.0
Democracy 117 1.55 6.36 -10.0 10.0 123 2.32 6.22 -10.0 10.0
Governance 138 -0.42 0.67 -1.8 1.3 146 -0.39 0.67 -2.3 1.2
2002 2011
* aggregated by donor groupings to facilitate presentation
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Empirical methods 
 The fact that aid data are downward-censored by zero – i.e. they cannot take on negative 
values – is the chief driver underlying the selection of an appropriate analytical model for this 
study. There are two common manners of dealing with this issue. The first approach, the 
Heckman two-step method, estimates first the factors that inspire donors to afford aid to a 
recipient at all and second the factors that motivate their choice about the precise amount of 
aid to commit. Mathematically, the model can be expressed with the following set of equations: 
 
P(Aidijt >0) = F(bZijt + vijt)     (1) 
Aidijt = cXijt + pσf(bZijt + vijt)/ F(bZijt + vijt) +uijt 
 
where i, j, and t represent the donor, recipient, and time respectively; Aidijt is the dependent variable; Z 
and X are independent variables for the selection and allocation equations respectively; b and c are 
parameter vectors; F () stands for the cumulative distribution (probit) function; u and v are normally 
distributed errors, cov(u, v) = p, f is the partial distribution function, and σ is the variance of u 
(Berthelemy 2006). 
 
 One mode of implementing the model in panel data is to compute the first equation using a 
panel Probit regression with boot-strapped standard errors, calculate the inverse Mills ratio and 
introduce it as an explanatory variable in the second, level-stage equation. The second equation 
is most often estimated using an OLS panel regression with fixed effects. However, given that 
the amount of aid committed in one year tends to be highly correlated with the amount 
committed the year before (in other words, aid data are serially correlated to the first degree) 
the utilisation of a General Method of Moments (GMM) model could yield more valid results. 
The main drawback of the Heckman model lies in its requirement that at least one variable 
included in the first stage be on the basis of theory excluded from the second stage, which is 
often hard to do. 
 The second main approach utilised by researchers to analyse censored aid data is the Tobit 
estimator, which takes the censored-nature of the data directly into consideration. The main 
difference with the Heckman model is that the Tobit one assumes that the factors that influence 
donors’ decisions whether to provide aid at all are the same as those that influence their decision 
regarding how much aid to commit. The relevant equation is the following: 
 
Aidijt = Max(cXijt +uijt, 0)     (2) 
 
where i, j, and t represent the donor, recipient, and time respectively; Aidijt is the dependent variable; X 
are independent variables for the selection and allocation process together; c is a parameter vector; u is 
the error term; and the aid committed is described as the maximum of zero and of a linear combination 
of the independent variables (Berthelemy, 2006). 
 
 Aside from the fact that the assumption that the variables significant at the eligibility stage 
are identical with those significant at the level stage might not always hold, the Tobit estimator 
has several other drawbacks. Mainly, it has a hard time managing a larger number of 
independent variables and it cannot be estimated with fixed effects to control for unobservable 
country characteristics.  
 Consequently, as my primary approach I use the Heckman two-step method with Probit 
regressions to estimate the first-level equations and GMM regressions (xtabond2) to estimate 
the second-level equations. Following Neumayer (2003c), as the exclusionary variable that is 
assumed to have an impact at the first but not at the second stage of donors’ aid-allocation 
decisions I use the amount of aid per capita received by each developing country from all other 
donors in the previous year. This amount is believed to increase a country’s chance to receive 
aid from every donor but not to influence the amount of aid received. In order to ascertain 
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robustness of the findings obtained through the Heckman approach, as part of the sensitivity 
analysis I also report estimates obtained with the Tobit model and with OLS regressions with 
fixed effects as substitutes for the GMM regressions in the second-level equations. 
 
Results 
 In this section, I present the results obtained with my primary analytical method, a Heckman 
two-step model with GMM as the second-level estimator. In order not to overwhelm readers 
with an excessive amount of numbers, tables in the main text display findings on the main 
independent variables only (Tables 2 and 3). Tables 4 and 5 in the Appendix list all the control 
variables utilised and indicate which ones were found to have a significant effect on which 
donor and in which direction – whether positive or negative. 
 
Primary results – The effects of good-behaviour variables on aid provision 
 Table 2 displays results for the non-DAC donors. Contrary to my initial expectations 
(Hypothesis 2), the results suggest that many non-DAC donors do reward some aspects of 
recipients’ good behaviour either at the eligibility or at the level stage of their decision-making 
about aid provision. The most commonly rewarded is democracy, with 18 out of 25 donors 
committing more aid to countries with better democracy (polity2) records. This behaviour is 
particularly observable amongst the non-DAC members of the OECD. Many donors within 
this group share a communist past, which has likely rendered them to perceive democracy as 
the most important good-behaviour trait from the four examined. Other common attributes 
observable for the loose groupings of non-DAC donors are that the providers of South-South 
Co-operation seem prone to positively compensate aid recipients’ performance in political and 
civil rights while Arab donors are inclined to do so for recipients’ governance.  
 Notably, even the donors feared to be the most rogue - China and Saudi Arabia – reward 
some good-behaviour qualities: China social and economic rightsxvi and Saudi Arabia 
governance. On the other hand, many non-DAC donors also apparently reward recipients’ ‘bad 
behaviour’, which to some extent defies my third hypothesis. This conduct appears most 
frequently vis-à-vis economic and social rights, with 11 of the 25 non-DAC donors committing 
more aid, ceteris paribus, to countries with worse performance in this area.  
 Table 3 provides comparable results for DAC countries. In line with my first hypothesis, I 
expected to discover a positive and significant relationship between DAC aid and recipients’ 
good behaviour at least some of the time. The results attained do support this hypothesis but 
interestingly, the effect of good behaviour on DAC aid-allocation decisions does not seem 
greater than on such decisions by non-DAC donors. In fact, the conditioning of DAC aid on 
recipients’ democracy is less consistent than in the case of non-DAC donors. This shortfall, 
however, is made up by greater consistency in conditioning on other aspects of good behaviour, 
primarily on economic and social rights and on governance. In the latter, particularly the Nordic 
Plus donors seem well aligned, with all of themxvii except for Ireland committing more aid to 
countries with better governance. In other ways, however, the groupings of DAC donors 
utilised in the presentation of results do not exhibit easily observable common characteristics. 
 With regard to the provision of aid in reward of bad behaviour, some DAC donors do it as 
well even though the practice appears to be less common than amongst non-DAC donors. To 
illustrate, while 15 out of the 25 non-DAC donors reward some aspects of recipients bad 
behaviour, ten out of the 24 DAC donors do so (more than 60 per centxviii of all non-DAC aid 
committed as opposed to approximately 40 per cent of DAC aid). In the DAC case, it is also 
not primarily concentrated on compensating countries for poor performance in economic and 
social rights, as with non-DAC donors, but more equally distributed throughout all four aspects 
examined (civil and political rights, social and economic rights, democracy, and governance).
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Table 2. The effects of human rights, democracy, and governance on the aid provided by non-DAC donors 
 
For each variable, the coefficient and underneath the Z score are shown. 1st stage regressions were run using a Probit model, 2nd stage regressions using a GMM model – both with robust standard errors. 
Numbers in bold are significant at least at the 10% level. All regressions included the control variables discussed in the Data section. 
 
Stage 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Civil and political rights -0.05 -0.02 0.12 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.10 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.10 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.01
0.54 1.03 2.56 4.25 1.14 0.59 0.38 0.29 0.16 1.63 0.48 0.95 0.18 0.68 1.25 1.10 1.04 0.76 1.18 0.98 2.28 1.23 0.39 1.60 0.80 0.13
Economic and social rights -0.02 0.00 -0.20 0.00 -0.08 -0.01 -0.11 0.04 -0.24 0.00 0.01 0.08 -0.04 -0.10 -0.10 0.04 -0.10 0.00 -0.19 -0.11 -0.11 -0.01 -0.18 -0.02 -0.17 -0.01
0.50 0.41 6.29 0.47 1.49 1.23 2.81 2.53 3.18 0.19 0.21 2.38 0.57 1.35 2.09 0.27 3.65 0.95 3.52 0.05 0.35 1.21 4.56 0.21 1.59 0.24
Democracy 0.04 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.07 -0.02 0.20 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.08 0.01
1.24 0.69 8.25 0.47 1.72 1.68 3.00 2.33 3.24 1.90 0.34 0.11 0.32 2.05 0.58 1.98 2.78 0.42 3.06 1.72 3.09 1.13 4.17 0.21 4.41 0.24
Governance -0.02 0.12 -0.80 0.03 -0.50 0.01 -0.32 -0.01 0.31 0.30 0.02 0.01 -0.48 -0.03 -0.23 0.00 -0.20 0.02 -0.13 0.05 -0.28 -0.08 -0.07 0.12 -0.13 0.10
0.05 3.01 3.18 1.01 1.40 0.23 1.03 1.30 0.49 2.74 0.05 0.78 0.94 1.48 0.59 0.10 0.85 0.05 0.45 0.21 1.24 1.17 0.25 2.60 0.73 1.29
N 489 108 951 665 951 119 761 186 951 89 951 649 666 47 951 112 951 856 375 78 951 177 951 175 951 576
Log lik./AR2 (Prob>Chi2) -247.0 0.149 -540.2 0.180 -138.5 0.592 -336.0 0.507 -156.6 0.302 -672.2 0.269 -75.7 -193.0 0.107 -520.5 0.517 -114.7 0.247 -366.2 0.359 -265.9 0.584 -477.2 0.579
Stage 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Civil and political rights 0.11 -0.07 0.21 0.10 -0.03 0.20 -0.05 -0.08 1.40 -0.03 0.98 0.28 -1.06 0.06 0.10 -0.07 0.12 0.06 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.99
1.66 0.66 2.19 1.37 0.67 1.91 0.57 1.33 1.43 1.00 0.16 2.07 1.56 0.58 1.37 1.43 1.39 0.89 0.24 0.60 0.04 0.62 3.88
Economic and social rights -0.19 0.00 -0.27 -0.09 0.05 -0.11 0.00 -0.22 -1.52 -0.03 0.32 -0.01 0.82 -0.06 -0.09 -0.16 -0.05 -0.07 0.00 -0.10 -0.03 -0.17 -0.04
4.36 0.02 4.01 1.51 1.69 1.57 0.18 5.64 3.46 1.62 0.04 0.17 1.23 0.82 1.51 4.95 1.01 1.61 0.00 2.65 0.80 3.68 2.80
Democracy 0.17 0.04 0.18 0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.00 0.10 0.16 0.01 0.35 0.24 3.73 0.01 -0.04 0.08 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.06 -0.04
5.18 0.02 3.41 1.26 2.37 0.62 0.20 4.81 0.60 1.49 3.90 2.48 3.02 0.27 2.14 4.22 0.66 0.94 1.18 0.95 1.01 1.97 0.29
Governance -0.60 -0.09 0.43 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.13 0.37 2.90 0.02 -5.58 -1.83 -6.83 0.38 0.47 -0.13 -0.42 1.05 -0.39 0.34 3.44 0.42 -2.81
2.02 1.08 0.96 0.07 0.82 0.19 2.06 1.56 0.85 0.22 0.49 2.17 1.62 0.66 2.20 0.48 1.31 2.41 1.42 1.32 2.57 1.10 0.55
N 951 175 951 89 761 489 47 666 125 100 21 951 37 951 84 489 78 951 507 951 103 951 479
Log lik./AR2 (Prob>Chi2) -359.9 0.521 -127.0 0.892 -334.9 -98.2 -363.7 0.946 -54.8 -77.5 0.156 -185.9 0.519 -534.6 0.289 -318.7 0.261 -279.1 0.903 -284.0 0.867
Non-DAC OECD members
Arab donorsProviders of South-South cooperation
Saudi Arabia UAEKuwait
Israel Turkey
Brazil RussiaIndiaChina South Africa
Poland Slovakia SloveniaLithuaniaCyprus Romania
Chile
Iceland
Taiwan ThailandColombia
EstoniaCzech Rep. Hungary Latvia
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Table 3. The effects of human rights, democracy, and governance on the aid provided by DAC donors 
 
For each variable, the coefficient and underneath the Z score are shown. 1st stage regressions were run using a Probit model, 2nd stage regressions using a GMM model – both with robust standard errors. 
Numbers in bold are significant at least at the 10% level. All regressions included the control variables discussed in the Data section.
Stage 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Civil and political rights -0.67 1.34 0.33 1.45 -0.06 -0.08 0.11 0.33 0.01 -0.13 0.13 -0.09 0.55 -0.44 0.28 -0.25 -0.10 1.34 -0.05 -0.24 0.05 -0.06 -0.07 0.02
1.63 0.82 0.39 3.28 0.39 0.32 1.17 2.89 0.10 1.01 1.07 0.30 0.78 1.14 2.89 1.61 1.15 1.99 0.51 1.57 0.53 1.57 0.50 0.87
Economic and social rights -0.14 -0.14 0.46 0.03 0.33 0.07 -0.02 0.72 -0.08 -0.01 -0.03 -0.38 -1.81 0.01 -0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.36 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.28
0.62 0.23 1.47 0.02 2.70 0.51 0.39 1.98 1.52 0.62 0.38 1.73 3.11 0.39 1.07 0.36 0.68 1.05 2.26 1.16 0.22 0.12 0.31 1.50
Democracy -0.07 0.52 -0.25 0.03 -0.13 -0.06 -0.05 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.08 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.44 -0.13 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.11
0.48 2.18 1.48 1.39 1.98 0.72 1.28 0.15 0.97 0.72 2.36 1.87 2.13 0.78 1.26 0.65 0.59 0.51 1.35 1.06 0.94 0.19 0.07 0.98
Governance 1.17 1.41 -1.31 -3.68 0.75 1.28 0.62 0.21 0.68 1.15 -3.24 2.23 0.74 0.13 0.82 0.43 0.36 -0.36 1.24 -0.62 0.98 0.04 1.57 -0.13
0.51 0.30 0.94 2.05 1.12 1.70 1.33 0.43 1.91 1.89 3.81 1.28 1.72 1.53 1.97 1.17 0.80 1.33 3.05 0.60 2.11 0.37 2.60 1.09
N 951 804 951 812 951 838 951 810 951 805 951 769 951 548 951 646 951 534 951 647 951 693 951 710
Log lik./AR2 (Prob>Chi2) -14.0 0.104 -16.5 0.224 -69.7 0.212 -219.9 0.186 -201.3 0.168 -128.7 0.253 -274.2 0.574 -207.5 0.935 -268.3 0.129 -254.0 0.285 -164.5 0.416 -114.9 0.391
Stage 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Civil and political rights 0.13 0.04 0.01 0.13 -0.04 -0.73 -0.06 -0.08 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.00 -0.16 -0.04 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.09 -0.13 0.02 0.00 0.39 -0.08 0.02
2.01 0.51 0.07 1.26 0.61 1.36 0.64 0.76 0.10 0.21 0.96 0.08 1.81 1.50 0.24 0.84 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.29 0.01 0.79 1.11 0.83
Economic and social rights -0.03 0.13 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.57 -0.08 0.07 0.09 -0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.09 0.06 0.24 0.01 0.16 -0.01 0.15 0.01
0.87 1.81 0.29 0.93 0.08 1.14 1.08 1.42 1.18 0.41 0.82 0.58 0.26 0.24 0.23 1.17 2.08 0.33 1.79 0.23 2.73 0.55 2.89 2.31
Democracy 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.11 0.07 -0.19 0.14 -0.03 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.61 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.80 0.10 0.03 0.24
0.90 1.19 0.02 3.55 2.26 0.73 3.15 1.13 1.65 0.75 0.85 0.16 1.55 0.60 0.43 0.60 1.66 0.25 0.38 1.06 2.27 1.15 0.73 1.04
Governance 0.10 -0.39 0.62 -1.13 -0.55 -0.82 -0.19 -0.95 0.08 0.22 -0.26 0.15 1.21 0.21 -0.18 0.19 0.57 -1.09 -0.50 0.05 -0.29 -0.36 0.24 -0.13
0.36 1.21 1.07 3.65 1.45 0.45 0.39 1.94 0.17 1.62 0.65 0.75 2.37 1.62 0.26 0.61 1.65 1.10 0.88 0.17 1.03 0.51 0.55 1.72
N 951 583 951 664 951 236 951 683 951 787 951 658 951 515 951 693 951 355 951 786 951 674 951 470
Log lik./AR2 (Prob>Chi2) -374.5 0.124 -172.3 0.669 -351.2 0.255 -168.4 0.116 -163.0 0.142 -197.4 0.904 -249.6 0.307 -117.8 0.248 -369.1 0.286 -42.1 0.180 -200.1 0.112 -306.7 0.160
Norway
Greece Italy Portugal Spain Austria
Largest DAC donors Nordic Plus donors
Southern European donors
EC France Germany Japan UK
Small European donors Other non-European donors
SwedenUS Denmark Finland Ireland Netherlands
Korea New ZealandBelgium Luxembourg Switzerland Australia Canada
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Secondary results – The effects of control variables on aid provision 
 Looking at factors other than recipients’ good behaviour that motivate aid provision from 
non-DAC donors, Table 4 in the Appendix shows that aid received in the previous year and a 
shared region are the most consistently and positively significant variables. In other words, 
most non-DAC donors are more likely to commit (more) aid to countries that lie in the same 
geographical region as themselves and that received a lot of aid from them in the previous year. 
While the first variable is indicative of a strategic choice on part of the donors – they are making 
an effort to build up and improve their own region, from which their own country could also 
benefit – the second one speaks of the ‘bureaucratic inertia’ of aid, which often tends to flow 
to countries only because they have been that donor’s aid recipients for a long time already 
(e.g. Carey 2007). This element is further reinforced by the fact that aid projects and 
programmes are generally of longer duration than one year (usually three to five).  
 Focusing on differences between the three non-DAC groups examined, while the non-DAC 
members of the OECD commit more aid to countries that already receive aid from other 
sources, this practice is not equally common amongst the providers of South-South Co-
operation, affording some evidence to the argument that the new donors contribute to plugging 
the gaps in aid provision by DAC donors and hence complement each other’s aid efforts 
(Chandy and Kharas 2011). The specificity of Arab donors appears to lie primarily in the 
greater role that recipients’ religion plays in their decision-making about aid: all three Arab 
donors are more likely to choose other majority Muslim countries as aid recipients. Finally, the 
non-DAC OECD members have been comparatively less motivated by trade with recipients 
than the other non-DAC donors. 
 Turning now to DAC aid, Table 5 in the Appendix reveals that DAC donors just like non-
DAC ones seem to be chiefly motivated in their decisions about how much aid to commit by 
the amount of aid provided in the year prior. Other salient determinants are the amount of aid 
received from other donors, recipients’ level of economic wellbeing (GDPpc and LDC status) 
and other recipient needs (conflicts and disasters). The latter two factors, recipients’ economic 
wellbeing and their other needs, appear to influence DAC aid in general more than non-DAC 
aid. A comparison of the various DAC groupings, on the other hand, does not reveal any 
conspicuous disparity. Minor differences can be observed regarding the influence of colonial 
past, which particularly impacts aid commitments by the largest DAC donors, and of 
commercial interests, which affect the aid provision by the largest DAC donors and Southern 
European donors more than the aid provision by other DAC donors. The final interesting 
observation here, applicable both to non-DAC and DAC donors, is that they are more likely to 
select as aid recipients developing countries with larger populations but once selected, they 
provide more per-capita aid to countries with smaller populationsxix. 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
 In order to assess the robustness of the results discussed in the previous section, I perform 
two different sensitivity tests. First, I substitute the two CIRI human rights measures – on 
political and civil rights and on economic and social rights – with Freedom House’s measures 
of political rights and civil liberties. Second, I estimate the original models using different 
empirical methods – OLS panel regressions with fixed effects instead of GMM regressions in 
the second stage of the Heckman two-step approach and panel Tobit regressions with robust 
standard errors.  
 Table 6 in the Appendix shows results from the first robustness test, specifically how 
political rights and civil liberties as measured by Freedom House affect aid giving by the donors 
examined and whether the impact discovered differs from the one found when using the CIRI 
human rights indicators. The two sets of indicators evaluate similar albeit not identical concepts 
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and the estimates in Table 6 confirm that similarity. Most of the findings align both in 
significance and in direction with those obtained with the CIRI data. 
 Key outcomes from the second sensitivity test can be viewed in Table 7 in the Appendix. 
Results from the OLS regressions with fixed effects are very similar to those attained in the 
GMM regressions utilised in the main analysis, with good behaviour variables exhibiting 
almost identical patterns in terms of direction and significance. One minor difference is that 
the estimates in the OLS regressions are slightly more significant, which is likely due to OLS 
not controlling for serial correlation of the aid data as does the GMM estimator. The Tobit 
estimator examines the two stages within the aid-disbursement process simultaneously and 
hence its findings do not align either with the Probit or with the GMM ones. Nevertheless, the 
results still show a relatively consistent pattern, i.e. if both the Probit and GMM estimates were 
positive, the Tobit one is as well and vice versa. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 For decades now, DAC donors have been verbally committed to promoting human rights, 
democracy, and good governance amongst their aid recipients, including through aid 
conditionality. The actual existence of this practice has been to some degree substantiated 
through empirical evidence and hence I anticipated finding a positive relationship between at 
least some DAC members’ aid provision and recipients’ good behaviour (Hypothesis 1). 
Conversely, with a view to the generally absent verbal commitment of non-DAC donors to 
promote better behaviour amongst their aid recipients, I did not hold out a comparable 
expectation vis-à-vis non-DAC donors (Hypothesis 2). The repeated emphasis of non-DAC 
donors – particularly those that are not members of the OECD – on non-interference in the 
internal affairs of their development partners further strengthened this belief. Nevertheless, as 
several empirical studies on the nature of non-DAC aid found it not to differ dramatically from 
DAC aid, I equally did not anticipate non-DAC aid to be provided in reward of aid recipients’ 
bad behaviour (Hypothesis 3). My results have provided evidence in support of the first 
hypothesis but to some extent contradicted both the second and the third one.  
 Regarding DAC aid first, as researchers before me, including Neumayer (2003a), 
Berthelemy (2005), and Nielsen (2013), I found most DAC donors to reward some aspects of 
recipients’ good behaviour in their aid-allocation decisions. They do so sometimes at the level 
stage but more often, still in line with Neumayer’s (2003a) findings from a decade ago, at the 
gate-keeping stage, when they determine whether to provide aid to a country at all. However, 
the donors are not particularly consistent in this behaviour – while some compensate recipients 
for better performance in civil and political rights, others do so for social and economic rights, 
for democracy or for governance. Most of them do not reward their aid recipients in more than 
one aspect of good behaviour and none do so in more than two, not even the Nordic Plus donors, 
who have been described as the most socially conscious donors. The similarity within the group 
is notable, however, as all the Nordic Plus members except for Ireland condition their aid 
commitments on recipients’ governance records. However, the other DAC country groupings 
have not exhibited an analogous level of similarity amongst each other from the perspective of 
conditioning aid on recipients’ good behaviour.  
 The key finding of this paper is that non-DAC donors do not differ significantly from DAC 
donors in rewarding recipients’ human rights, democracy, and governance performance, 
despite expectations to the contrary. Unlike DAC donors, many non-DAC donors have made 
no promises to condition their aid on recipients’ good behaviour. Consequently, I anticipated 
discovering no statistical relationship between recipient countries’ human rights, democracy, 
and governance records on the one side and non-DAC aid on the other, perhaps with the 
exception of aid from non-DAC donors that are members of the OECD. However, I found most 
non-DAC donors, not just the OECD members, to be rewarding some aspects of their 
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recipients’ good behaviour at some point in their aid commitments. This rewarding is not 
uniform or consistent– for example, while non-DAC OECD members focus in aid provision 
on countries with better democracy scores, providers of South-South Co-operation do so more 
often for political and civil rights – but neither is, as mentioned previously, the rewarding by 
DAC donors.  
Is non-DAC aid then promoting good behaviour amongst its recipients? Even after setting 
aside the quandary of whether aid conditioning has the ability to do so at all, the answer to that 
question cannot be directly positive as my results suggest that many non-DAC donors also 
reward their recipients for certain aspects of bad behaviour. Often they do so simultaneously 
with rewarding some aspects of good behaviour, for example, by committing more aid to 
countries with better governance scores but at the same time less aid to countries with better 
democracy performance. Many DAC donors do not differ from non-DAC ones on this account 
either, however. Although this negative conditioning by both non-DAC and DAC donors 
appears even more haphazard than the positive one and as such is likely a side-effect of political 
considerations rather than a of deliberate intent, it is still objectionable as it might arguably 
promote the abuse of human rights, democracy, and governance amongst some aid recipients. 
 Consequently, although it is not clear from this study whether either DAC or non-DAC aid 
actually fosters better behaviour amongst aid recipients, on the issues of aid conditioning on 
human rights, democracy, and good governance the DAC and non-DAC donors have turned 
out to be quite comparable. In fact, differences within the two groups of donors appear greater 
than those between them, at least over the decade examined. From this viewpoint it is 
understandable why the partnership agreement from Busan (2011), signed by both DAC and 
non-DAC donors, has been able to mention human rights, good governance, and to some extent 
even democracy as the common underpinning principles of all development co-operation 
provided globally. This starting convergence of the DAC and non-DAC relationships between 
aid and recipients’ good behaviour both in theory and in practice might signify the emergence 
of stronger universal norms with regard to the importance of human rights, democracy, and 
good governance to development. 
 To argue that DAC and non-DAC aid have now become undistinguishable in their 
characteristics would be premature, however. Even though this study focused on the good-
behaviour aspects of aid provision and shown the two donor groups (DAC and non-DAC) to 
be very similar from this perspective, DAC aid when analysed as a group appears to be better 
targeted towards recipients’ needs than non-DAC aid overallxx. Nonetheless, as Chandy and 
Kharas (2011) posited, the different characteristics and modalities of non-DAC aid as opposed 
to DAC aid do not necessarily mean that non-DAC aid is worse but perhaps only different and 
by extension complementary to DAC aid. This might be particularly true of the providers of 
South-South Co-operation, who – unlike the rest of non-DAC and DAC donors – commit more 
aid to countries largely left behind by other donors.  
In conclusion, while non-DAC aid does not appear to be systematically and consistently 
conditioned on recipients’ good behaviour, it equally does not appear to be rogue. Rather, my 
analysis has suggested that non-DAC donors are motivated by a similar mix of self-interest, 
development-need, and good-behaviour reasons as DAC donors. The main difference between 
the two groups appears to lie in the slightly greater attention that DAC donors pay to recipients’ 
development needs.  
The answer to the central question of this paper, in which I enquired whether non-DAC 
donors differed from DAC ones in their conditioning of aid on human rights, democracy, and 
governance, is hence largely no. Even though many non-DAC donors never pledged to reward 
good human-rights, democracy, and governance records in their aid giving, my results suggest 
that they nonetheless often do so. This conditioning on their part seems somewhat random, but 
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so does such conditioning by DAC donors, in spite of their much stronger verbal commitment 
to the cause.  
The expressed worry that the rising significance of new donors will disturb the harmonious 
and sustainable development brought forward by DAC aid programmes hence appears 
unfounded, even in the case of the most ‘feared’ donors such as Saudi Arabia and China. 
Instead, my results tentatively point to the emergence of stronger and wider acceptance of 
human rights, democracy, and good governance as essential to sustainable development 
amongst all donors, not only verbally as exemplified by the Busan Partnership Agreement 
(2011) but also in practice. Future research in this area should open up the ‘black box’ of aid 
flows and explore whether donors condition aid giving on recipients’ good behaviour 
differently through different aid instruments (e.g. grants versus concessional loans). Further 
studies could also look at other approaches to integrating human rights, democracy, and good 
governance in development programming, explore whether DAC and non-DAC practice 
converges or rather diverges in those areas, and perhaps most importantly, investigate whether 
such interventions actually have the potential to foster good behaviour amongst aid recipients. 
 
i A part of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) since 1961, the Development Assistance 
Committee is an international forum for many of the world’s largest providers of development aid. As of 2015, it has 29 
members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America 
(http://www.oecd.org/dac/developmentassistancecommitteedac.htm (10 March, 2015)). 
ii Throughout the article, I refer to aid recipients’ positive performance in the areas of human rights, democracy, and good 
governance as ‘good behaviour’ and to negative performance in those areas as ‘bad behaviour’. I chose to operationalise ‘good 
behaviour’ as respect for human rights, democracy, and good governance because they are most commonly mentioned by aid 
documents as the qualities that aid should strive to foster. Different aid agencies have set out to promote other positive qualities 
as well, including peace, gender quality, and the rule of law, but in order to keep my analysis focused and concise, I chose not 
to examine those in this article. (In addition, ‘rule of law’ constitutes a subset of most good-governance measures). 
iii This approximation has been commonly used by researchers including Neumayer (2003a, 2003b) and Doucouliagos and 
Paldam (2011). 
iv The South-South Co-operation Movement effectively dates back to this African-Asian Conference. While the non-
interference clause in the Bandung Principles is frequently referenced, it is less known that the Principles also mention the 
importance of respect for human rights. 
v By ‘some of the time’ I mean that I expect to find that at least some DAC donors reward recipients’ good behaviour either at 
the eligibility or at the level stage. 
vi The Czech Republic, Iceland, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia are now members of the DAC but became so only in 2013. 
Romania is not yet member of the OECD but I include it in this group because it is an EU member state. 
vii The Nordic Plus are an informal collective of like-minded donors; the UK is also often included in the group but I examine 
it here as part of the largest DAC donor group instead. 
viii Data on net official development assistance only – repayments were subtracted. 
ix Referred to as ‘physical integrity rights’ in the database. 
x These are used more frequently in literature than the CIRI measures but have been shown to contain a strong pro-US bias 
(Steiner 2014). 
xi http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/democracy 
xii On the other hand, the two sets of human rights measures are too collinear to be included in one regression together. 
xiii I use population as a control variable to capture the ‘small-country bias’, according to which smaller countries receive 
higher amounts of aid per capita than more populous countries (Dreher et al. 2011). 
xiv Usually also specific projects are mentioned. 
xv Another potential limitation here, pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, could be the generally better quality of aid data 
from more recent years than from the more distant ones. However, since I used as the lower cut-off point a relatively recent 
year of 2002, the difference in the quality of the first- and last-period data is likely not very significant in my study. 
xvi The finding on China’s support for social and economic rights is not actually very surprising given its regime’s formally 
Communist underpinning. 
xvii Including the UK, which in this study has been listed in the group Largest DAC donors. 
xviii On the basis of my data, I calculated approximately 60 per cent of non-DAC aid but that was without Chinese aid since no 
precise information on that aid exists. Since China is probably the largest non-DAC aid provider, the percentage is likely 
significantly higher than 60.  
xix Confirmation of the afore-mentioned ‘small-country bias’. 
xx That is if as ‘needs’ one understands countries’ level of economic development or having experienced a disaster. This finding 
aligns with conclusions by Dreher et al. (2011). 
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Appendix 
 
Table 4. The effects of control variables on non-DAC aid 
 
+ means a positive significant effect, - a negative significant effect, a blank space no effect. The Heckman two-step method with GMM was used to estimate the requisite regressions. 
  
Regression stage 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Aid previous year (volume) + + + + + + + + + + + +
Exports + + + + + + +
Military aid per cap. + + -
Colony + - + - + - -
Region + + + + + + - + + + + + + +
Muslim - + + - - +
Christian - + + + -
GDP per cap. (log) + - + - - - + + +
LDC + + + + - + + +
Conflict + + + + - + +
Disaster + - - - + - - + + - -
Population (log) + - + + + - + + - + - + - + + -
Aid from other donors (pc) + + + + + + + + + + +
Regression stage 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Aid previous year (volume) + + + + + + + + +
Exports + + + + + + + + + +
Military aid per cap. + + + - + - +
Colony + + - + +
Region + + + + + + + + + - +
Muslim - + + + + -
Christian + - - + + - + -
GDP per cap. (log) + - - - - - + +
LDC + + + + + +
Conflict - + - - -
Disaster - - + - + - - + - +
Population (log) + - + - - + -
Aid from other donors (pc) + + + +
Kuwait
Non-DAC OECD members
Providers of South-South cooperation Arab donors
Chile Colombia Taiwan Thailand Saudi Arabia UAE
Turkey
Brazil RussiaIndiaChina South Africa
Czech Rep. SlovakiaHungary SloveniaEstonia Latvia LithuaniaCyprus RomaniaIceland Israel Poland
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Table 5. The effects of control variables on DAC aid 
 
+ means a positive significant effect, - a negative significant effect, a blank space no effect. The Heckman two-step method with GMM was used to estimate the requisite regressions. 
Regression stage 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Aid in previous year (volume) + + + + + + + + + + +
Exports + + + + + -
Military aid per cap. + + -
Colony + + + + + - - - +
Region + + + - - +
Muslim - - -
Christian - +
GDP per cap. (log) - - - - - - - - - - - - -
LDC + - - + +
Conflict + - - +
Disaster + + + - - + + - +
Population (log) + - + - + + - + - + + + + + +
Aid from other donors (pc) + + + + + + + - +
Regression stage 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Aid in previous year (volume) + + + + + + + + + +
Exports + + +
Military aid per cap. -
Colony + + + - + + +
Region + + + + + + + + + +
Muslim + - - - - -
Christian + - - + - - - +
GDP per cap. (log) + - - - - - -
LDC + + + - +
Conflict - -
Disaster - + + + + - + +
Population (log) + + - + + + + - + + + - + + +
Aid from other donors (pc) + + + + + + + + -
France UK
Austria
Largest DAC donors Nordic Plus donors
Southern European donors Small European donors Other non-European donors
Denmark Finland Ireland Norway Sweden
New ZealandGreece SpainItaly
USEC Germany Japan
SwtizerlandLuxembourgPortugal
Netherlands
KoreaBelgium Australia Canada
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Table 6. Sensitivity Analysis Test (1): CIRI Human Rights Measures Substituted by Freedom House Measures of Human Rights 
 
 
This table displays results from regressions identical to those in Tables 2 and 3 with the exception that the CIRI human rights measures were substituted by the FH measures. For each 
independent variable, the coefficient and underneath the Z score are shown. Numbers in bold are significant at least at the 10% level.   
Stage 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Political rights 0.32 0.00 0.17 0.02 0.19 0.00 0.40 -0.02 0.09 -0.05 -0.17 0.02 0.13 0.33 0.25 -0.01 -0.13 0.00 -0.02 0.27 0.04 0.05 0.41 0.03 0.27 0.19
2.34 0.06 1.66 0.43 1.41 0.29 2.84 0.78 0.50 1.18 1.16 0.97 0.86 3.14 1.92 1.06 1.40 0.04 0.18 0.15 0.35 1.32 3.42 0.44 2.90 1.10
Civil liberties -0.55 0.01 -0.67 0.00 -0.27 -0.01 -0.47 0.04 -0.36 -0.05 0.05 0.09 -0.07 -0.04 -0.07 0.01 -0.20 0.07 -0.07 -0.12 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.18 -0.22
3.04 1.17 5.77 0.41 1.53 0.85 3.12 1.08 1.62 1.28 0.29 2.69 0.36 1.48 1.46 1.96 1.43 1.14 0.45 1.58 0.73 0.73 0.36 0.92 1.77 1.49
N 951 108 951 665 951 119 951 186 951 89 951 649 951 47 951 112 951 856 951 78 951 177 951 175 951 576
Stage 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Political rights 0.16 -0.18 1.20 0.00 -0.18 0.31 0.01 -0.15 0.12 0.06 1.62 0.21 0.06 0.28 0.79 0.24 1.12 0.31 1.19 0.10 0.16 0.13 0.09
1.32 1.13 2.13 0.11 2.02 1.83 0.59 1.64 0.13 1.07 1.68 1.85 0.97 2.53 0.49 2.59 1.34 2.28 2.61 0.91 1.04 1.00 1.56
Civil liberties -0.45 0.20 -0.15 -0.05 0.16 -0.36 0.00 -0.22 4.15 0.00 0.83 -0.16 0.58 -0.78 -2.61 -0.43 -0.35 -0.40 0.09 -0.23 -1.27 -0.42 -0.05
3.09 0.18 0.61 0.29 1.65 1.74 0.44 2.07 1.31 0.06 0.18 0.49 1.55 4.41 1.03 3.08 0.31 2.31 0.34 1.93 1.29 2.83 1.09
N 951 175 951 89 951 951 122 951 125 100 21 951 37 951 84 951 951 507 951 103 951 479
Providers of South-South cooperation Arab donors
UAEBrazil Chile China Colombia India Russia South Africa Taiwan Thailand Kuwait Saudi Arabia
Non-DAC OECD Members
Cyprus Czech Rep. Estonia Hungary Iceland Israel Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Turkey
Stage 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Political rights -0.12 1.50 0.27 0.66 0.54 0.10 0.08 0.64 0.12 -0.02 0.02 0.60 -0.01 -0.01 0.21 -0.02 -0.13 0.66 -0.10 -0.15 -0.02 0.07 0.07 0.00
0.99 1.35 1.02 2.86 1.31 0.29 0.43 1.93 1.18 0.60 0.07 1.06 0.10 1.07 1.78 2.16 1.16 1.85 0.98 0.88 0.11 0.75 0.31 0.06
Civil liberties -0.25 -0.63 -0.08 1.09 -0.38 0.91 0.01 0.07 -0.26 0.12 -0.25 -0.52 -0.91 0.13 -0.46 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 0.06 0.01 -0.32 0.13
0.92 0.46 0.19 3.54 1.30 1.52 2.21 0.78 1.80 0.34 0.89 0.86 0.60 2.22 1.45 2.39 0.04 0.39 0.40 0.45 0.34 0.09 1.25 1.69
N 951 856 951 812 951 856 951 856 951 805 951 856 951 548 951 646 951 534 951 647 951 693 951 856
Stage 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Political rights 0.22 -0.05 0.16 0.59 -0.01 0.36 -0.09 0.17 0.05 0.09 0.20 0.75 -0.16 -0.02 0.29 0.04 0.26 -0.49 -0.35 -0.10 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02
2.58 0.49 1.15 1.27 0.06 0.70 0.68 0.74 0.39 1.00 1.51 1.36 0.97 0.52 1.00 0.24 1.90 0.79 0.89 1.33 0.04 1.52 0.19 0.46
Civil liberties -0.39 0.05 -0.26 -0.77 0.02 -0.38 -0.15 0.17 0.11 0.10 -0.22 0.33 0.13 -0.07 0.09 0.13 -0.26 0.16 0.21 0.06 0.13 -0.05 0.33 0.11
3.23 1.25 1.30 1.25 0.13 0.44 0.62 0.37 0.56 0.67 1.36 1.02 0.67 1.35 0.27 0.81 2.03 0.37 0.57 0.52 2.17 1.49 1.68 1.75
N 951 583 951 664 951 236 951 683 951 787 951 658 951 515 951 693 951 355 951 786 951 674 951 470
Southern European donors Small European donors Other non-European donors
New ZealandGreece Italy Portugal Spain Austria Belgium Luxembourg Switzerland Australia Canada Korea
Largest DAC donors Nordic Plus donors
EC France Germany Japan UK US Denmark Finland Ireland Netherlands Norway Sweden
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Table 7. Sensitivity Analysis (2): Regressions Estimated with Tobit Models and Panel OLS Regressions with Fixed Effects 
 
For each independent variable, the coefficient and underneath the Z score are shown. Numbers in bold are significant at least at the 10% level. All regressions included the control 
variables specified in the Data section. 
  
Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe
Civil and political rights -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 -0.09 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02
0.73 0.95 2.11 1.60 0.37 0.24 0.26 0.18 0.29 0.02 0.75 1.15 0.07 1.14 1.22 0.34 0.47 0.53 0.13 0.41 2.53 1.92 0.47 1.15 0.33 0.31
Economic and social rights -0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.04 -0.45 -0.27 -0.11 -0.04 -0.08 -0.02 -0.09 0.04
1.36 1.20 3.97 0.46 0.99 2.97 3.11 1.94 4.15 0.73 1.06 2.37 1.79 0.71 1.73 1.13 1.26 1.37 1.49 1.68 0.35 2.78 5.23 1.40 2.48 0.78
Democracy 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.19 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.30 0.01 0.00 0.23 0.41 0.06 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.16 0.12
1.97 0.43 4.77 0.82 1.72 1.37 2.44 0.69 2.31 0.24 0.50 0.56 1.54 1.34 0.03 1.94 0.93 0.12 1.34 0.70 3.09 2.73 4.27 0.33 6.39 3.13
Governance 0.04 0.06 -0.10 -0.06 0.02 0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.21 0.36 -0.05 0.17 -0.04 0.34 0.32 0.06 -0.11 -0.26 0.12 -0.17 -0.28 -0.15 0.11 0.39 -1.07 -0.95
0.16 2.61 2.64 0.58 0.09 2.64 0.61 0.08 1.80 1.42 0.60 2.13 0.52 1.43 2.21 2.33 0.71 0.81 0.71 0.05 1.24 1.36 0.96 1.53 3.33 1.44
N 951 110 951 665 951 76 951 186 951 95 951 649 951 951 122 951 856 951 95 951 177 951 175 951 576
Log lik./R2 (within) 2674 0.23 -540.2 0.06 3279 0.71 -153.3 6.39 1454 0.169 -433.4 0.157 3576 0.82 3264 0.29 -1053 0.01 279 0.30 -366.2 0.05 -191.4 14.19 -1001 0.087
Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe
Civil and political rights 0.08 -0.13 0.04 0.01 0.14 0.00 -1.85 3.37 -0.39 0.98 -0.02 0.60 0.00 -0.04 0.02 -0.11 0.20 0.12 -0.22 -0.41 0.17 0.36
1.62 0.93 3.86 1.13 2.14 0.57 0.76 1.64 0.72 0.16 0.08 0.70 0.34 1.58 1.31 1.17 2.25 1.02 0.83 1.56 0.26 1.09
Economic and social rights -0.08 0.14 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -10.10 -1.96 -0.50 0.32 -0.48 0.43 -0.31 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.13 0.10 -0.49 -0.14 -1.23 -0.43
2.71 1.74 0.69 1.63 0.40 0.18 6.37 1.24 1.35 0.04 2.60 0.76 0.77 0.32 0.77 0.37 1.46 1.09 2.88 1.09 3.01 1.85
Democracy 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.30 0.03 0.00 5.39 -1.40 0.26 0.35 0.48 2.18 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.07 0.08 0.02
4.29 1.74 0.65 1.84 1.48 0.20 5.34 1.53 1.39 3.90 3.49 2.87 2.10 0.36 0.87 0.24 1.10 0.28 0.29 0.62 0.34 0.14
Governance -0.36 -0.21 0.07 0.00 -0.33 0.13 11.07 37.82 0.13 -5.58 -1.03 -6.26 0.03 -0.15 -0.07 0.42 2.39 -1.11 1.76 2.85 4.22 -3.91
1.88 1.16 1.61 0.26 1.47 2.06 1.21 1.43 0.06 0.49 0.80 1.57 0.96 0.96 0.88 0.44 1.69 1.06 1.52 2.13 1.25 1.43
N 951 175 951 111 951 47 951 125 100 21 951 37 951 109 951 318 951 507 951 103 951 479
Log lik./R2 (within) -412.6 36.27 4216 0.20 2330 0.47 -833.7 27.90 -55.73 43.51 -116.0 68.09 44.97 0.09 -1184 0.02 -1516 0.390 -499.3 0.253 -2116 0.034
Providers of South-South cooperation Arab donors
UAEBrazil Chile China Colombia India Russia South Africa Taiwan Thailand Kuwait Saudi Arabia
Non-DAC OECD Members
Cyprus Czech Rep. Estonia Hungary Iceland Israel Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Turkey
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Table 7 (continued). Sensitivity Analysis (2): Regressions Estimated with Tobit Models and Panel OLS Regressions with Fixed Effects 
 
For each independent variable, the coefficient and underneath the Z score are shown. Numbers in bold are significant at least at the 10% level. All regressions included the control 
variables specified in the Data section. 
 
Stage Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe Tobit OLSfe
Civil and political rights -0.49 1.95 0.18 0.18 -0.23 0.14 0.00 0.28 -0.10 -0.17 0.11 -0.15 0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.09 1.20 -0.38 0.26 0.10 0.06 0.39 0.54
1.31 1.16 0.88 0.81 1.11 0.57 0.00 1.91 1.34 1.60 0.40 0.46 1.09 0.33 0.02 0.69 0.78 1.70 1.25 1.12 1.48 0.47 1.14 1.68
Economic and social rights -0.09 -0.62 0.17 0.18 0.09 0.13 -0.16 0.42 -0.01 0.01 -0.53 -0.08 0.02 0.02 -0.43 0.01 -1.42 0.01 0.15 -0.07 -0.04 -0.08 0.45 0.44
0.36 0.47 1.28 1.10 0.68 2.20 1.20 1.40 0.09 0.07 2.92 0.34 0.89 0.47 0.57 0.86 1.74 0.57 0.74 0.71 0.89 1.04 1.90 1.86
Democracy 0.16 1.50 0.06 0.13 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.04 0.16 0.11 -0.12 -0.18 1.06 0.83 0.21 0.06 -0.07 -0.10 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.15
0.91 1.69 0.61 1.06 0.51 0.35 0.03 0.00 0.73 0.56 1.31 0.83 2.12 1.08 1.99 1.65 3.69 1.26 0.54 1.15 0.52 1.22 7.20 0.98
Governance 0.15 1.56 -0.21 -0.39 2.06 1.40 0.28 0.51 0.89 1.81 2.01 5.47 0.95 1.45 0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.32 3.29 -4.03 0.39 0.70 0.31 0.37
0.06 2.08 0.16 0.21 1.89 0.76 0.81 1.33 3.21 2.15 1.21 1.77 3.75 2.15 0.34 0.47 0.43 1.56 1.79 0.92 1.52 0.65 1.39 1.52
N 951 856 951 825 951 856 951 856 951 801 951 856 951 668 951 779 951 643 951 712 951 810 951 856
Log lik./R2 (within) -4630 0.803 5443 0.05 -3914 0.078 1347 0.100 1048 0.02 -3426 0.362 -1353 0.14 -315 0.01 -412 0.10 -3284 0.04 -1896 0.02 -2024 0.091
1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Civil and political rights 0.49 0.03 -0.12 0.02 -0.12 -0.47 -0.85 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.12 0.02 0.01 0.49 0.13 0.21 0.09 0.05 0.60 0.63 -0.01 0.00
1.14 0.32 0.85 0.21 0.50 0.82 0.71 1.70 0.23 0.06 0.52 0.69 1.03 0.98 0.18 1.91 1.35 1.17 1.32 0.55 2.29 1.81 0.72 0.23
Economic and social rights 0.03 0.04 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.86 -0.08 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.22 0.00 0.17 0.03 0.10 0.23 0.08 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.13
0.94 1.01 2.00 0.01 0.21 1.08 1.19 0.53 0.87 1.16 0.43 1.40 1.61 0.22 1.89 0.69 1.47 0.85 0.20 0.03 1.00 0.58 0.54 1.24
Democracy 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.10 0.00 -0.05 -0.08 0.50 0.18 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01
0.64 1.06 0.72 1.02 0.34 0.28 1.41 2.05 0.64 1.40 1.14 0.91 0.96 0.22 1.94 1.23 1.80 1.96 0.83 0.20 1.44 0.57 0.80 0.62
Governance 0.01 -0.06 -1.28 -1.07 -0.85 -3.46 -0.70 1.49 0.20 0.12 0.22 1.15 -0.10 -0.07 -0.17 0.28 -2.94 -1.37 0.11 1.39 -0.33 -1.16 0.12 -0.16
0.06 0.31 2.74 1.56 0.54 0.69 1.10 1.11 1.02 0.46 1.50 2.55 0.67 0.35 0.45 0.55 1.86 1.15 0.31 1.32 2.31 1.56 2.04 1.78
N 951 653 951 785 951 337 951 804 951 789 951 777 951 645 951 800 951 518 951 885 951 813 951 492
Log lik./R2 (within) -1491 0.009 -2627 0.012 -3058 0.175 -2251 0.026 -1486 0.089 -999 0.075 -1123 0.082 -1775 0.022 -2357 0.058 -1879 0.03 -983 0.104 -200 0.034
Southern European donors Small European donors Other non-European donors
New ZealandGreece Italy Portugal Spain Austria Belgium Luxembourg Switzerland Australia Canada Korea
Largest DAC donors Nordic Plus donors
EC France Germany Japan UK US Denmark Finland Ireland Netherlands Norway Sweden
